Minorities and mistrust: On the adoption of ethnic recognition to manage conflict

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Abstract

An enduring debate in the conflict management literature concerns the wisdom of recognizing versus avoiding reference to ethnic identities in institutions to manage ethnic conflict. Understanding why ethnic recognition occurs is crucial for informing this debate. We develop a theory based on functional and political mobilization effects of recognizing ethnic groups. Contrary to reasoning that minority leaders would be most interested in recognition, the theory suggests that recognition consistently favors the interests of leaders from larger, plurality groups, whereas minority leaders face a 'dilemma of recognition' between functional gains and mobilization threats. We use mixed methods to test our theory. For our quantitative analysis, we draw on an original coding of recognition in constitutions and comprehensive political settlements from 1990-2012. We find that for cases with leaders from plurality groups, recognition is adopted 60 percent of the time. With leaders from minority groups, the rate is about 40 percentage points lower, even after accounting for many background factors. Additional quantitative tests and a qualitative analysis present more detailed evidence to show that the processes correspond to the logic of our theory. Answering these questions about when and why recognition is adopted is a crucial step in evaluating its effects on conflict.

Keywords: ethnic conflict; minority rights; peace agreements; ethnic identity; identity politics

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Introduction

Past violent conflict is a robust predictor of future conflict (Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Walter, 2010). Moreover, conflicts with an ethnic component are nearly twice as likely to recur (Mattes & Savun 2009, 754). This raises important questions about institutional choices in the aftermath of ethnic violence. Current literature focuses intensely on institutions as the basis of societal harmony (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), including peace after ethnic conflict (Kuperman, 2015; Reilly, 2001; Reynolds, 2011). In such instances, a fundamental institutional choice is whether or not ethnic groups should be recognized explicitly. Indeed, this choice defines an 'enduring debate' in the literature and policy discussions (McGarry, O'Leary & Simeon, 2008).

An example illustrates the possibilities. With similarly troubled pasts and nearly identical ethnic and material structural conditions, Rwanda and Burundi have answered the institutional question differently, both ostensibly in the aim of peace. Burundi's 2005 constitution entrenched public institution quotas for Hutus and Tutsis after the 1993-2004 civil war. In contrast, Rwanda's 2003 constitution resolves to 'eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions,' and mere reference to Hutu or Tutsi identity can be reason for prosecution under anti-genocide laws. What informs these diametrically opposed choices under such similar circumstances?

We study why some countries adopt ethnic recognition to manage conflicts while others do not. Understanding this institutional choice is a crucial first step toward assessing its impact on peace. By ethnic recognition, we mean the formal identification of ethnic groups by name in constitutions or political settlements. While the literature discusses philosophical merits of recognition and commonality of recognition-based policies (Krook & O'Brien, 2010; Reynolds, 2005), to our knowledge ours is the first systematic mapping of the adoption of recognition in the

context of violent conflict. Analyses of recognition strategies tend to say little about the motivations for adopting them (Sisk, 1996: 77). Yet, it is important to study the origins of institutions, focusing on critical junctures that follow social upheaval (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Our theoretical analysis below points to a key factor that may inform leaders' choices about recognition: their status as minority or non-minority group members. One may reason that *minority* leaders would be most interested in recognition to institutionalize respect for ethnic identities and minority groups (Taylor, 1992; I Young, 1990). Recognition allows for 'group-differentiated rights' such as ethnic quotas or autonomy arrangements (Horowitz, 2000; Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka & Shapiro, 1997) that address risks of 'tyranny of the majority' (McGarry, O' Leary & Simeon, 2008).

However, we argue that such an assessment of the *functional advantages* of recognition overlooks the *political mobilization* effects. Our theoretical prediction is that *non-minority* leaders are likelier to prefer recognition. This may seem counter-intuitive, but the logic is simple. Amidst identity-based conflict, leaders face inter-group mistrust and potential for identity-based remobilization (McGarry, O' Leary & Simeon, 2008). Recognition facilitates inter-ethnic comparisons and ethnic mobilization and, thus, may entrench ethnicity as a political cleavage (Horowitz, 2000). This is to plurality groups' advantage, but for minority groups it presents a risk.[1] The potential gains, paired with the risks, produce the 'dilemma of recognition' (De

[1] We use the terms 'plurality' and 'non-minority' to account for the possibility that the largest group in society may not make up a majority of the population.

Zwart, 2005). This dilemma has political bite for minority group leaders, but not for plurality group leaders.

We use mixed methods to assess this theoretical prediction. We draw on a dataset that incorporates an original coding of ethnic recognition in constitutions and comprehensive settlements adopted amidst violent political conflict from 1990-2012.[2] Using quantitative cross-national analysis, we find that for cases with leaders from plurality groups, recognition is adopted 60 percent of the time. With leaders from minority groups, the rate is about 40 percentage points lower, a pattern that holds even after accounting for many potential confounders. The quantitative analysis structures a qualitative investigation (Lieberman, 2005). We find credible illustrations in Rwanda, Burundi, and Ethiopia that the structural conditions underlying our theory hold in practice and that the dilemma of recognition plays out through mechanisms that conform to our theory.

Minority leaders and recognition

The goal of our analysis is to understand leaders' strategies for managing ethnic conflict.[3] We focus upon the choice of whether or not to adopt ethnic recognition. We operationalize ethnic recognition as the explicit naming of ethnic groups in constitutions or political settlements. Ethnic recognition is distinct from non-discrimination clauses that bar differential treatment

[2] In this study, we do not address issues related to implementation.

[3] Following Chandra (2006), ethnicities are socially-constructed identities associated with descent-based characteristics.

based on ethnicity. Recognition also stands in contrast to bans on references to ethnicity (Basedau & Moroff, 2011; Ishiyama, 2009).

There are strong arguments both in favor and against recognition as a conflict management strategy. On one side, a growing group of scholars contend that accommodative institutions, guaranteeing rights to ethnic groups, build peace (Cederman et al., 2014; Lijphart, 1977, 1985; McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). Subordination along ethnic lines has historically provided a cause for violent inter-group conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013; Gurr, 1993; Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009). Recognition strategies have the potential to redress grievances by granting groups status or allowing for more precise targeting of resources along ethnic lines (Cunningham, Loury & Skrentny, 2002; Horowitz, 2000: 657-659). Other scholars make the case that integrative institutions that reduce the political salience of ethnic groups best prevent conflict (Horowitz, 1991, 2000; de Zwart, 2005). This could avoid 'freezing' divisions that emerged in the heat of conflict (Simonsen, 2005) and open more space for conflict transformation (Taylor, 2001). Lieberman & Singh (2012) argue that historically, institutionalizing ethnicity contributes to ethnic war. This debate between accommodative and integrative strategies – or recognition and non-recognition – as well as a number of intermediary strategies (Kuperman, 2015; Roeder, 2005; Sisk, 1996) continues. Our premise is that we need to understand conditions leading to the adoption of recognition to avoid confusing cause with effect.[4]

[4] Brancati & Snyder (2011; 2013) apply an analogous strategy in studying the effects of electoral timing on the durability of peace agreements.

To understand patterns in the adoption of recognition, we must consider how leaders might view it. We analyze a very stylized setting that brings strategic dynamics into sharp relief. (A formal model is in the supporting information.) We demonstrate that the 'dilemma of recognition' is especially pronounced for minority leaders.

Our setting is one of recent or ongoing violent conflict where ethnicity is an important basis of political mobilization. Our analysis rests on a number of key observations. First, we observe that leaders who preside over a country's political regime are typically concerned with political survival. Our analysis is based on the idea that such leaders have the power to decide how ethnicity will be treated under the regime and the ability to adopt recognition should they wish to do so. This assumption is relevant in circumstances of violent mobilization, when leaders often achieve a degree of power beyond ordinary politics (King, 2007), but may be less convincing in cases of usual legislative politics.

In settings of ethnic conflict, the leader is a member of an ethnic group that faces opposition ethnic groups. The political survival of the leader might be threatened by a critical mass of opposition group members deciding to contest his/her authority. In such situations, the leader would evaluate strategies for dealing with this threat. As Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009) suggest, members of the opposition group would support contestation if they believe opportunities available to their group are below some critical threshold. We also observe that ongoing conflicts generate situations of inter-ethnic mistrust (Collier et al., 2003; Posen, 1993; Snyder & Jervis, 1999). It is up to the leader to decide how to manage this mistrust, including how to deal with ethnic identities.

Two effects of recognition imply that the preference for recognition increases in the size of the regime leader's ethnic group relative to that of opposition groups. These effects are that (i)

recognition may allow leaders to overcome the mistrust of opposition members more efficiently than non-recognition and (ii) that ethnic recognition confers a relative advantage to larger ethnic groups in their ability to mobilize in the future.

Effect (i), the *functional* effect of recognition in managing opposition mistrust, is based on three mechanisms that have been examined in the literature. First, the symbolic value of being recognized confers a direct benefit to opposition members (I Young, 1990; Taylor, 1992). Second, by allowing for transparency about the allocation of resources along ethnic lines, opposition members are able to more precisely evaluate how well the regime is treating them, which in turn makes it easier for the regime to win opposition members' trust (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Weisskopf, 2004). Third, recognition may be a step toward institutionalizing opposition group rights, which reduces their uncertainty about how they will fare in the future (McGarry, O' Leary & Simeon, 2008). These functional effects make recognition attractive to leaders interested in ensuring stability regardless of whether they are from a minority or plurality group.

However, recognition effectively entrenches ethnic divisions, yielding effect (ii), the *mobilization* effect of recognition: should they wish to do so, groups can take advantage of the opportunity to use ethnic appeals to enhance their political position. The current literature is clear in identifying substantial coethnic advantages in political mobilization, and recognition lowers the barriers to such mobilization (Bates, 1983; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Varshney, 2007). Institutions that facilitate ethnic mobilization should be especially advantageous to larger ethnic groups, who will then be in a better position to bargain over the distribution of spoils (Posner, 2005). Social identity theory suggests that mere mention of groups can cause people to think about themselves differently (Tajfel, 1982), meaning that recognition provides a nudge toward

mobilization along ethnic lines. In contrast, by avoiding recognition, minority groups may hope to 'transcend' ethnicity as the primary line of political competition, thereby overcoming a structural, demographic disadvantage (Smith, 1986: 214-217).

Plurality group leaders face no conflicting pressures when it comes to recognition: they benefit from both the functional and mobilization effects. But for a minority leader, the losses due to the mobilization effect may outweigh the gains from the functional effect. Holding all other considerations fixed, recognition should be a dominant strategy for plurality group leaders. For minority group leaders, the situation depends on the relative strength of the functional versus the political mobilization effects – a dilemma of recognition. This yields the following hypothesis:

> *H1: All else equal, minority group regime leaders should be less likely to adopt ethnic recognition than plurality group regime leaders.*

The force of this logic depends on the starkness of the difference in the strategic positions of minority versus plurality groups. This starkness is affected by the level of ethnic fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country belong to different ethnic groups (Alesina et al., 2003). Minority status matters much more in situations of lower ethnic fractionalization. It is in those cases that the minority stands distinct relative to a clear majority group (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Under high ethnic fractionalization, minority status may be less strategically meaningful because no one group demographically dominates society.

This theory relegates to the background some complicating factors. We presume that the regime leader is not concerned with how recognition affects potential dissent from his/her own group. We do not focus upon more perverted applications of recognition that seek to reinforce inequality rather than redress it (Cinalli, 2005). Our analysis also ignores the possibility that majority leaders may have an easier time enacting new provisions. Given these complexities, the relationship between minority/non-minority status and recognition is unlikely to be perfect. But if the logic developed above characterizes the essence of the dilemma of recognition, we expect general patterns to conform to our hypothesis.

Methods

We use a mixed-methods approach to test our theory. Using first a cross-national quantitative analysis, we then apply research design principles from Lieberman to select 'well predicted cases' to qualitatively trace whether the assumptions and mechanisms of our theory characterize what actually occurred (2005: 444). Because of the impossibility of experimental variation in our primary explanatory factor of interest (minority status of leaders), the qualitative analysis allows us to evaluate threats to the validity of our interpretations of the 'effect' of minority status.

Data

We coded the adoption of recognition in constitutions or comprehensive settlements promulgated in the context of violent inter-group conflicts from 1990-2012.[5] Constitutions and

[5] The 1990 cut-off is justified on the basis of allowing us to focus on post-Cold War circumstances with a manageable number of cases.

comprehensive settlements represent ‘constitutional moments’ that fundamentally define the terms of a regime[6] and are more entrenched and difficult to revise than other legal measures (Lerner, 2011: 210-211). We acknowledge that recognition may be articulated in other ways (e.g. in legislation) and that a few of the non-recognition decisions that we coded may have little to do with the conflict (e.g. arguably the 1997 amendments to the Pakistan constitutions). This makes ours a conservative estimate of the rate at which recognition is adopted. We also note the possibility of informal recognition, for example through cabinet appointments. Our view is that recognition in a constitution or settlement more clearly signals leaders’ preferences than informal arrangements, which may be used for more tactical purposes and may be more ‘fragile’ (Spears, 2013). Recent research on the relationship between formal and informal recognition comes to different conclusions. In Africa, for example, some have found high rates of informal ethnic accommodation despite infrequent formal recognition (Francois, Rainer & Trebbi, 2015) while others have found informal arrangements to be less accommodative than formal institutions (Kuperman, 2015).[7]

Our main analyses below pool constitutions and settlements together. One could argue that they should be analyzed separately, because settlements may be more malleable and they only arise amidst conflicts that are not resolved by military victory. We view this as an empirical question and so we include a robustness check (reported in our supporting information) to evaluate whether adoption patterns are different for constitutions versus settlements.

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[6] The rate of recognition is similar across these two types of documents.

[7] In Kuperman’s data, patterns of formal vs. informal accommodation are similar for minority and plurality-led regimes.

We identified cases of violent conflict from the internal conflict datasets constructed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.[8] These cases involve deadly violence reaching at least 25 deaths. We did not select cases on the basis of whether the conflicts are commonly labeled as 'ethnic wars' since the relevance of recognition may extend beyond such cases. We do, however, examine whether results change when we consider only cases commonly regarded as ethnic wars. We operationalized 'constitutional moments' as comprehensive peace agreements, constitutions, or constitutional amendments adopted since 1990 and that take place amidst or immediately following (that is, within a year of) violent conflict.

We defined a 'recognition' variable that took a value of 1 if the constitution or settlement explicitly identified multiple ethnic groups, by name, as constituting the population of the country, and took the value of zero if no such explicit mention is made. The coding does not consider the precise configuration of who is being recognized. Further, it is possible that a document both recognizes ethnic groups and bans particular uses of ethnic references. In such cases, we nonetheless coded the outcome as recognition. We consulted various primary, news, and academic sources, including direct communication with dozens of country experts, to finalize the set of cases as well as our coding. A list of our cases and coding is provided in Table A1 of the supporting information.

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[8] This includes their Internal Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2013 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Melander, Pettersson & Themnér, 2016), Non-State Conflict Dataset, Version 2.5-2013 (Sundberg, Eck & Kreutz, 2012; Melander, Pettersson & Themnér, 2016), and the One-Side Violence Dataset, Version 1.4-2013 (Eck & Hultman, 2007; Melander, Pettersson & Themnér, 2016). The data are available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/.

Our main explanatory variable of interest is the minority status of the regime leader. We used the dataset on 'ethnic minority rule' produced by Fearon, Kasara & Laitin (2007). Their dataset covers up until 1999 and we applied their coding rules to our cases to complete the coding to 2012.[9] This variable is based on the ethnicity of the head of state at the time that the settlement or constitution was put forward. It takes a value of one for cases where this head of state is from a group that is not the plurality group in the country, and a zero otherwise. An assumption in using this measure is that the head of state is pivotal in determining the terms of the political regime. This will not always be the case, for example in situations where insurgent forces have more influence over regime outcomes. For testing our hypothesis, this would represent measurement error that attenuates the relationship between our minority leader variable and recognition (thereby producing a bias that works against us).

Dealing with endogeneity

We also consider alternative explanations and confounders. Any relationship between the adoption of recognition and the minority status of leaders could be spurious to confounding factors. In identifying such confounders, we consider *mechanisms that give rise to minority leadership*. The literature suggests two mechanisms in particular. First, countries that have lower levels of exclusion and horizontal inequality may be more likely to have minority leaders and,

[9] We rely primarily on ethnicity data from Fearon (2003) and the CIA *World Factbook* (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/), and leaders data from Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) to cover up to 2004 and then head of government data from the CIA *World Factbook* to cover 2004 to 2012. For cases that could not be completed from these sources, we consulted biographic information reported in news sources online.

presumably, also less likely to adopt recognition policies (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009). Second, regionally concentrated minorities are unlikely to win broad appeal and thus have a disadvantage relative to larger groups in becoming heads of state (Posner, 2005). Presumably, regional concentration of groups also makes recognition more likely, to manage the concentrated interests of such groups. Confounding may also arise due to levels of development, political institutions, intensity and military outcomes of the conflict, the engagement of the international community, or inter-regional differences, variables conventionally incorporated into analyses of conflict resolution dynamics. We drew on various existing data sources for these variables. Finally, adoption patterns may depend on cultural values that vary across regions. As such, we include region dummy variables to account for such heterogeneity. (Variable sources and summary statistics are included in the supporting information, Tables A2 and A3.) We use logistic regression that controls for these factors. The supporting information also contains a robustness check using a non-parametric matching estimator.

Regression control strategies cannot fully overcome the fact that the emergence of minority leadership is deeply endogenous. Experimental variation is impossible and we could not identify a source of quasi-experimental variation. To attribute the outcomes that we observe to the variation in minority leadership that we measure, we seek four types of evidence. First, the effects should be of high magnitude, in which case their sensitivity to confounding from unobserved variables will be low (Imbens, 2003; Rosenbaum, 2002: Ch. 4). Second, the size of the effects should be robust to quantitative control strategies as described above. Third, we should find evidence for more elaborate implications of the theory (Rosenbaum, 2002: 5-6). For this, we test two interaction effects propositions: first is the proposition that minority leader effects are smaller when ethnic fractionalization is higher, and second is the proposition that

minority leader effects are stronger in cases that are classified as ethnic conflict. Fourth, the qualitative analysis should demonstrate that the decision-making process follows the logic of our theory and does not present more convincing alternative accounts (Van Evera, 1997: 55-67).

Trends

Figure 1 and Table I show temporal and regional trends in the adoption of recognition in constitutions, amendments, and settlements in conflict-affected countries from 1990-2012. There are 86 cases in our dataset. Cases of recognition represent 43 percent (37 cases), indicative of this period having been an 'era of identity politics' (Eisenberg & Kymlicka, 2011). The rate of adoption holds steady over the years that we cover.

We see substantial inter-regional differences in the rate of adoption. European cases include the Balkans, Northern Ireland, constitutional revisions in the Russian Federation, and the Caucasus; all eleven of these cases adopted recognition. We qualitatively explore the European cases in the supporting information and note that recognition in Europe may be affected by regional norms. But because all European leaders in our dataset represent pluralities, we cannot say definitively whether the patterns in Europe are driven more by our logic of recognition or by regional norms and external intervention. The European pattern is in stark contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa, where only 17 percent (7) of the 40 cases we identified adopt recognition. Across the Middle East, North Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and the Americas, recognition occurs in a majority of cases, whereas in South and Central Asia recognition occurs in a minority.

[Figure 1 and Table I here]

Quantitative analysis

Our quantitative analysis tests our hypothesis that recognition will be substantially less likely in cases where the regime leader comes from a minority ethnic group. The outcome is our binary coding of recognition adoption. Table II shows the basic pattern. These basic results conform to the expectations of our theory. In cases where regime leaders come from non-minority (that is, plurality or majority) ethnic groups, recognition is adopted 60 percent of the time. But when the leader comes from a minority group, recognition is adopted only 24 percent of the time.

[Table II here]

Table 3 provides results of logistic regressions that control for potential confounders. (The tables report marginal effects, which measure the estimated change in the probability of recognition given a unit change in the variable, holding all other regressors to their means.) This set of models adds the various controls described above. The results suggest that the basic relationship captured in Table II is robust to controlling for these factors.

[Table 3 here]

As model (6) shows, the negative relationship between minority leaders and recognition adoption is considerably stronger when we limit ourselves to cases coded as ethnic conflict in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). Rather than the 30-40 percentage point difference in rates of adoption that we see in the overall set of cases, in the subset of 'ethnic conflicts' the difference is 55 percentage points. The interaction term is not statistically significant however, given the modest sample size (model 7).

Models (8)-(10) use dummy variables for the regions shown in Table I to account for unmeasured inter-regional heterogeneity. This forces us to drop the European cases given that all 11 of them were cases with recognition. Nonetheless, when we do so, we find that the relationship between minority leaders and recognition remains strong in terms of the point estimates. Thus, the effect is not driven solely by the European cases nor is it spurious to inter-regional heterogeneity.

Model (11) considers how the effect of minority leadership is modified by the extent of ethnic fractionalization. Above, we discussed that an implication of our theory is that the effect of minority status should be stronger in situations with lower ethnic fractionalization (fewer groups), which makes minority status more relevant strategically. Model (11) includes the interaction of the minority leader variable and ethnic fractionalization. The nature of the effect is as we expect, although given the relatively small number of cases, the interaction term itself is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, as Figure 2 displays, in cases of very low ethnic fractionalization, the predicted rate at which ethnic recognition is adopted is much lower under minority leaders (about a 70 percentage point difference). Where ethnic fractionalization is very high, minority leaders do not affect the likelihood of adoption.

[Figure 2 here]

The supporting information contains other robustness checks. First, we evaluate robustness to model specification by using the non-parametric 'bias-adjusted' matching estimator of Abadie & Imbens (2011). The results are consistent with the regression estimates. Second, a possible objection is that the 86 cases that we study represent a 'selected' sample. That is, they represent cases in conflict-affected countries where a political agreement was *reached*. It could be that plurality leaders try to avoid agreements altogether. This would undermine our story if

such avoidance were related to the possibility of recognition occurring should an agreement be reached. To evaluate this possibility, we extended our dataset to include all years of conflict in all countries from 1990-2012 and conducted an event history analysis of whether agreements were reached. The results suggest that at best, minority leaders are associated with a small and statistically insignificant increase in the likelihood that an agreement is struck in any given year. Next, we studied whether results differ for constitutions versus settlements, finding no indication that they do. After that, we studied interaction effects between minority leadership and levels of bloodshed, finding no significant evidence of such an interaction. Finally, we conducted a test of whether informal recognition tends to substitute for formal recognition (see supporting information section 10). We find that this is not the case—indeed even after controlling for many background characteristics, formal recognition is associated with a pronounced reduction in future levels of ethnic exclusion. The finding that minority leaders are much less likely to adopt recognition is quite robust and appears to be meaningful.

Nonetheless, without experimental or quasi-experimental variation in minority leadership, such a quantitative analysis does not, on its own, seal the case for the interpretation provided by our theory. Rather, we turn to richer, qualitative evidence.

Qualitative analysis

We follow Lieberman's proposal to scrutinize good-fit cases (2005: 444) to assess whether our interpretation of the quantitative results is valid. We include Rwanda (2003), a minority-led government that did not adopt recognition, and Burundi (2005), a plurality-led government that adopted recognition. These two countries share nearly identical structural conditions and similar histories of conflict, and yet have leaders who have pursued diametrically opposed strategies. We

also include Ethiopia (1994), a minority-led government that adopted recognition in a country with very high ethnic fractionalization. Ethiopia is often said to have similar leadership to Rwanda (Matfess, 2015), allowing us some control for leadership style. If our theoretical explanation is valid, we should find two patterns. First, we should find evidence of the relevant *structural conditions* for our theory: that there is a credible regime leader, a basis of ethnic rivalry and mistrust, and the potential for remobilization. Second, we should find that the *decision-making process* follows the causal logic of our theory and that other confounding factors were not driving recognition decisions. For example, we should find that leaders considered minority or plurality status, ethnic fractionalization, and the functional and mobilization effects in making decisions about recognition. If our interpretation of quantitative results were wrong, we would expect not to observe these patterns and, moreover, find more convincing alternate explanations (Van Evera, 1997: 55-67).

Rwanda

Rwanda's 2003 constitution fits our theory. Promulgated under President Paul Kagame, a minority Tutsi, not only are ethnic groups not recognized, the constitution sets to 'eradicate… ethnic, regional and other divisions and promot[e] national unity' (Article 9).

Evidence of structural conditions

The structural conditions that underlie our theory are evident for Rwanda. The constitution was adopted after the civil war (1990-1993) and 1994 genocide that left, according to government estimates, nearly one million people dead. While many Hutus were killed during the genocide, Tutsis are considered to have been the primary targets. The genocide ended through a military victory by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), putting an end

to more than forty years of majority-Hutu-led government since independence. According to common wisdom, but no longer measured as per the current non-recognition policy, Tutsis represent 14 percent of the Rwandan population in contrast to Hutus, who represent roughly 85 percent and Twas comprising just 1 percent. Based on a long history, as well as the ongoing presence of Hutu extremists in the Congo, ethnic mistrust and the potential for opposition group remobilization remained high (Rafti, 2006). Finally, Kagame's role as the regime agenda setter was well established by 2003 (Reyntjens, 2004).

Evidence of dilemma of recognition in the decision-making process

Consistent with our theory, the Rwandan leadership was very conscious of the majority/minority dynamics in determining a post-genocide identity strategy. In theory, after a military victory, the RPF would have been in a good position to enshrine recognition for the Tutsi minority it most represented, and/or the Hutu majority to help assuage mistrust, had it wished to do so. Yet, according to numerous scholars, for a Tutsi minority who wishes to maintain and 'mask [its] consolidation' (Reyntjens, 2004, 178) of disproportionate power, 'ethnic amnesia' is a good strategy to detract attention from their dominance and therefore prevent mobilization against them (Lemarchand, 1996, see also Bradol & Guibert, 1997; King, 2014; Pottier, 2002). To support their ban on ethnicity, the government often equates ethnic 'division' with 'categorization' and has vague divisionism and ethnic ideology laws upon which people can be jailed. The government has 'created a phobia of talking about ethnicity' (King, 2014: 141).

Additional Considerations

Rwandan history provides additional counterfactual support for our theory: had a majority been in power after the genocide, the leadership would likely have supported

recognition. Indeed, after the 1959 ‘social revolution’ and violence against Tutsis surrounding independence, the Parmehutu party (French acronym for Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement), whose leader ultimately became the first President of independent Rwanda (1962-1973), advocated for recognition. The ‘Hutu Manifesto’ became government policy, emphasizing Hutus’ historical marginalization by Belgians and Tutsi leaders and stated that ‘…we are strongly opposed, at least for the time being, to removing the labels 'Mututsi', ‘Muhutu' and ‘Mutwa' from identity papers. Their suppression would create a risk of preventing the statistical law from establishing the reality of facts’ (cited in Prunier, 1997: 46). Two successive Hutu governments ‘emphasised sharp ethnic contours’ (Pottier, 2002: 62), for instance, decreeing that national educational needed to indicate the ‘racial’ proportions of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas in schools. The governments also introduced ethnic quotas for promotion past primary school and public employment (King, 2014). In contrast, the *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR), a pro-monarchy Tutsi-dominated party, called on the ‘Children of Rwanda’ to ‘unite our strengths’ and insisted that ‘There are no Tutsi, Hutu, Twa. We are all brothers!’ (cited in King, 2014: 45). Reyntjens explains that the RPF’s denial of ethnicity today is ‘an essential element of the hegemonic strategies of small Tutsi elites, such as the powerful in Rwanda during the 1950s and in Burundi between 1965 and 1988’ (2004: 187).

Burundi

In contrast to Rwanda today and to Burundi historically, Burundi’s 2005 constitution includes explicit quotas for members of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. This accords with our theory, in that the constitution was adopted under the incumbency of majority-Hutu president Domitien Ndayizeye, although below we discuss some nuances associated with the strong

bargaining position of the largest rebel faction, the *Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie – Forces pour la defense de la democratie* (CNDD-FDD).

Evidence of structural conditions

Like its neighbor Rwanda to the north, Burundi's ethnic structure is conventionally understood as being constituted as 85 percent Hutus, 14 percent Tutsis, and 1 percent Twas. Also like Rwanda, Burundi had endured a post-independence history marked by inter-ethnic mistrust, rivalry, and violence (Lemarchand, 1996; 2009; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2000). Key events include the purging of military officers and coup in 1966 and a Hutu uprising in 1972 that triggered a genocidal crackdown by the military regime, resulting in some 150,000-200,000 deaths, mostly Hutus (United Nations, 1996). Decades of repression gave way to a tumultuous attempt at democratization in 1993, when elections brought into power Hutu leader Melchior Ndadaye (Reyntjens, 1993). Ndadaye was assassinated four months after being elected in a bungled coup attempt by officers thought to be associated with a hardline Tutsi faction (United Nations, 1996). As southern Tutsi elites initiated a restoration of their authority, Hutu elites mobilized for insurgency. The CNDD-FDD became the largest insurgent group. Major fighting ended with the 2003 Pretoria agreement, with the CNDD-FDD having taken control over large swathes of territory, forcing the southern-Tutsi dominated army to concede a radical redistribution of military power that, in turn, provided the basis for the CNDD-FDD's political rise (Samii, 2014).

The recognition outcome under Ndayizeye, a majority leader, conforms to the expectations of our theory. At the same time, attention to Ndayizeye distracts from the fact that constitutional negotiations were driven by the interaction between the ascendant CNDD-FDD and Tutsi elites (Lemarchand, 2009). Hutu leaders, both Ndayizeye and the CNDD-FDD

leadership, would have had many reasons to be sensitive to the potential for Tutsi remobilization. This includes the memory of the coup of 1993, the restoration of Tutsi authority in neighboring Rwanda, as well as a pugnacious movement of Tutsi intellectuals (Lemarchand, 2009: 159-162).

Evidence of dilemma of recognition in the decision-making process

Given such inter-ethnic mistrust, our theory proposes that majority leaders would view recognition as an efficient method for securing the acquiescence of the ethnic opposition. That recognition also favors the majority group in its ability to mobilize politically is an added advantage. The leadership's enthusiasm for recognition-based strategies is evident in the extraordinary extent to which the constitution uses them in defining quotas. Article 124 requires that vice-presidents be from different ethnic groups, while Article 129 mandates that Hutus constitute no more than 60 percent of ministers and vice ministers, while for Tutsis the ceiling is 40 percent. Article 143 applies the same formula for quotas in the public administration, while Article 164 mandates a 60-40 distribution of Hutu and Tutsi deputies in the national assembly. Article 255 calls for reforms to the security forces that ensure ethnic balance. Article 266 requires ethnic balance in the electoral commission and local administrative units.

Superficially, one could view the quotas in the 2005 constitution as merely a mechanism for consolidating Hutu gains. But the nature of the quotas is indicative of an intention to manage the mistrust of the Tutsi opposition. The quotas are far more generous to Tutsis than what one would expect under either fair division by ethnic distribution or division on the basis of mass political support.

Additional considerations

While we acknowledge important differences, the structural similarities between Burundi and Rwanda allow us to view them comparatively. The two countries differ enormously in the

ways that they have addressed ethnicity recently in a manner that corresponds with the propositions of our theory. We can also look at change over time in Burundi. The 1992 constitution, under which the ill-fated 1993 elections took place, was promulgated under the rule of Tutsi president Pierre Buyoya. It contains no quotas or other recognition provisions and emphasizes a need for ethnic unity.

Ethiopia

Like Rwanda, Ethiopia's 1994 constitution was adopted under a minority government, leading us to expect non-recognition. In contrast, the constitution states, 'every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession' (Article 39.1). It also lays out rights that each 'Nation, Nationality and People' has specific rights to language, culture, the preservation of history and self-government (Article 39.2). This recognition outcome is unexpected yet not entirely inconsistent with our theory: in contrast to Rwanda and Burundi, with ethnic fractionalization scores of .18 and .29, respectively, Ethiopia's level of ethnic fractionalization is much higher at .76. Our theory suggests that minorities will be more likely to adopt recognition if ethnic fractionalization is high, because the political mobilization effects are less threatening.

Evidence of structural conditions

Meles Zenawi, the leader of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), was President at the time of the 1994 Constitution. Tigrayans represent roughly 6 percent of the Ethiopian population, constituting the third largest ethnic group, and are territorially concentrated in the northernmost region of Ethiopia, Tigray. There are over 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia with Oromo (35 percent) and Amhara (27 percent) comprising the two largest groups.

According to Zenawi himself, 'the key cause of the war all over the country was the issue of nationalities' (quoted in Spears, 2010: 78). The situation was arguably one of high mistrust and potential for remobilization. Ethiopia had endured civil war since 1974 leaving over 1.4 million dead. The TPLF was a founding member of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF brought into alliance several ethnically-based groups who ultimately defeated the Dergue in 1991.

Evidence of dilemma of recognition decision-making process

The dilemma of recognition predicts that concern over potential ethnic mobilization against them may have prevented the minority-Tigray leadership from recognizing ethnicity, although mobilization is less of a concern with high ethnic fractionalization. Indeed, in this case, it appears that the functional benefits of recognition outweighed the mobilization concerns. Tigrayan leadership well understood the implications of stemming from an ethnic minority and were 'shrewd' in their consequent calculations. As Spears argues, '[t]he ethnic politics and the constitution…were not arrived at with the overall interests of Ethiopia in mind, with the belief that this was the best way to maintain Ethiopian unity. It was essentially a form of self-preservation. That was the agenda' (2010: 83).[10]

The Ethiopia case highlights the differences in strategic calculations when ethnic fractionalization is high. The TPLF allied with other groups in order to win a military victory and needed to take their concerns into account in the constitution. Zenawi explained, 'without guaranteeing these rights [for which people had been fighting, it] was not possible to stop the war, or prevent another one from coming up' (quoted in Spears, 2010: 78). Such reasoning

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[10] This section draws on Spears (2010), J Young (1997; 2004), and Vaughan (1994).

highlights the functional gains of recognition. At the same time, by establishing nine ethnically-based states, the government directed political competition to these areas and promoted Tigrayan interests in the center through control of the army, security forces and economy. Critics suggest that it hoped to divide the opposition, in other words, an effort at stemming mobilization against them. Given their geographic concentration, Tigrayan leaders may have seen self-determination and secession as a fall back in the event the TPLF were unable to dominate Ethiopia.

Conclusion

The peacebuilding value of ethnic recognition is debated. Some point to its utility in addressing grievances and imbalances between groups, while others point to the dangers of entrenching ethnicity as a basis of mobilization. In this paper we propose that such considerations, which define the 'dilemma of recognition,' also play into the strategic calculations of leaders deciding on recognition policies. For leaders from plurality groups, recognition is a win-win: it provides functional benefits in managing the mistrust of opposition ethnic groups and allows leaders to take advantage of their groups' numerical superiority in the event they wish to do so. For leaders of minority groups, the functional and mobilization effects of recognition work in opposite directions, presenting a dilemma. Examining constitutions and comprehensive political settlements from 1990-2012, regimes with leaders from plurality groups adopt recognition about 60 percent of the time, while for regimes with minority leaders, the rate of adoption is about 40 percentage points lower, even after accounting for many background factors. The difference is even larger when we restrict ourselves to conflicts conventionally understood as ethnic wars. When ethnic fractionalization is low, in which case minority-majority differences are starker, the pattern is yet more pronounced. We pursue further evidence of the plausibility of the

interpretation through qualitative analyses. The results provide additional evidence in favor of our theory. We show that the strength of the association between minority leaders and recognition means that even if it is not the only reason for variation in recognition, it is likely a crucial one.

Our analysis draws attention to the enduring importance of ethnic dynamics in political decision-making. It is crucial to understand what drives the institutionalization of identity, as this itself may have consequences (Lieberman & Singh, 2012). At the same time, *non*-institutionalization of ethnic identity does not necessarily imply an 'escape' from ethnic politics. In cases with histories of ethnic mobilization, it may be the continued salience and fear associated with ethnic mobilization that drives such non-institutionalization. The implication is that one cannot neglect the politics that give rise to the adoption or non-adoption of recognition when considering their effects.

A limitation of this study is due to challenges of measurement. Coding the outcome variable required judgment calls. Also, it is not always clear who is the agenda-setting 'leader' during the negotiation of a political settlement. Nor is the assessment of the minority status of leaders always straightforward. Table A1 in the supporting information suggests that among our cases, South Africa's 1993 constitution is the most pronounced anomaly of a minority-led government (led by then-president FW de Klerk) adopting recognition (recognizing languages of ethnic groups and calling for judicial institutions that are representative in terms of race). A reasonable interpretation of this case is that Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress were the true agenda setters (Waldmeir, 1998). At the other end of the spectrum, Sudan's 1998 constitution is the most pronounced anomaly of a plurality leader (president Omar al-Bashir of the Arab plurality) avoiding recognition. Some, however, have argued that Bashir's membership

in the northern Ja'aliyyin tribe constitutes the more significant identity, given that such minority northern tribes have dominated the national government since independence (El Tom & Salih, 2003; Musa, 2010). Of course, other cases of measurement error may not fall in line so neatly with our theoretical expectations.

Our analysis is a necessary first step toward estimating the effects of recognition. Understanding when and why recognition is adopted helps us to (i) distinguish the effects of such policies from the conditions that promoted their adoption in the first place (an internal validity concern), (ii) identify good cases to investigate and compare (another internal validity concern), and (iii) define scope conditions for the generality of findings that we derive from particular cases (an external validity concern). We hope that future research might take the results that we have developed here to study the effects of recognition – a crucial question for conflict management.

Data replication

The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.

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Table I. Regional patterns in adopting recognition in constitutions, constitutional amendments, and comprehensive settlements in conflict-affected countries, 1990-2012.

Region	**Percent with recognition**	**N**
Sub-Saharan Africa	17%	40
Americas	67%	6
East/Southeast Asia	60%	10
Europe	100%	11
Middle East/N. Africa	56%	9
South/Central Asia	40%	10
World	43%	86

Table II. Patterns in adopting recognition by the minority status of the leader's ethnic group for constitutions, constitutional amendments, and comprehensive political settlements in conflict affected countries, 1990-2012.

Leader type		**Recognition** No	Yes	Total
Non-minority	*N*	18	27	45
	%	40%	60%	
Minority	*N*	31	10	41
	%	76%	24%	
Total	*N*	49	37	86
	%	57%	43%	

Pearson $\chi2 = 11.10$, $p < .001$.

Table III. Minority ethnic group leader as a correlate of ethnic recognition, logistic regression estimates (marginal effects reported)

Outcome is ethnic recognition in constitution or settlement (0/1)											
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Minority leader (d)	-0.36**	-0.32*	-0.31*	-0.44**	-0.44**	-0.55*	-0.20	-0.26	-0.46	-0.55*	-0.70*
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.42)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Pre-violence minority leader (d)		-0.06	-0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.01
		(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.16	-0.52	-0.58	-0.57	-0.52	0.74	0.92	0.79	-0.90
			(0.37)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.57)	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.74)	(0.49)	(0.66)
Ethnic conflict (d)			0.25†	0.12	0.16		0.28	0.10		-0.01	0.16
			(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.19)		(0.20)	(0.16)		(0.22)	(0.20)
Excluded proportion			0.02	0.35	0.42	0.55	0.38	0.24	0.42	0.26	0.41
			(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.39)	(0.28)	(0.44)	(0.31)	(0.45)	(0.29)
Regionally concentrated groups (d)			0.14	0.31†	0.37**	0.45**	0.36**	-0.15	0.04	-0.22	0.37**
			(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.46)	(0.34)	(0.54)	(0.14)
log(GDP/capita)				0.02	0.01	-0.09	0.01	-0.12	-0.12	-0.13	0.00
				(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Freedom House 'partly free' (d)				0.08	0.18	0.33	0.11	0.13	0.36	0.20	0.16
				(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.19)
log(mountain percent)				0.22*	0.26*	0.20	0.25*	0.17†	0.21	0.17†	0.27*
				(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.12)
log(fatalities + 1)				0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.00
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
PITF atrocities historical max				-0.08	-0.09†	-0.10	-0.09	-0.09*	-0.14*	-0.10*	-0.10
				(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Military victory (d)				-0.26†	-0.32*	-0.34*	-0.31**	-0.23**	-0.18*	-0.22*	-0.32*
				(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Previous powersharing (d)					-0.01	0.16	-0.01	-0.15	-0.07	-0.14	-0.03
					(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.22)
International engagement (d)					0.25†	0.36†	0.22	0.25	0.52	0.33	0.28†
					(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Ethnic conflict X minority leader (d)							-0.32			0.40	
							(0.25)			(0.28)	
Ethnic fractionalization X minority leader (d)											0.73
											(0.88)
Minority leader + ethnic conflict X minority leader (i)							-0.52**				-0.14
							(0.22)				(0.16)
Region dummies	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Year trend (linear + quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	86	86	81	75	75	54	75	65	42	65	75
Omitted observations	None	None	No excl. prop.	No excl. prop. FH `free'	No excl. prop. FH `free'	No excl. prop. FH `free' Non-eth. conf.	No excl. prop. FH `free'	No excl. prop. FH `free' Europe	No excl. prop. FH `free' Non-eth. conf. Europe	No excl. prop. FH `free' Europe	No excl. prop. FH `free'

Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering by country. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(i) sum of main effect (Minority leader) and interaction effect (Ethnic conflict X minority leader) coefficients.
"No excl. prop." refers to cases omitted due to missing "Excluded proportion" data: Djibouti 1994 and 2001; Pakistan 2011; Sierra Leone 1999, and Sudan 2011.
FH `free' refers to cases coded as "free" by Freedom House. These predict recognition perfectly and so these cases are dropped from models (4)-(10).
The dummy variable for Europe predicts recognition perfectly and so these cases are dropped from models (8)-(10).
"Non-eth. conf." refers to cases that are not coded as "ethnic conflicts" in the Wimmer et al. (2009) dataset.



Figure 1. Proportion over time of new constitutions, constitutional amendments, and comprehensive political settlements in conflict-affected countries with recognition, 1990-2012. The dashed line is a trend line produced using a kernel smoother with a 5-year bandwidth; the gray shaded area is a 95% confidence interval.



Figure 2. Predicted probability of ethnic recognition under plurality (solid line) and minority (dashed line) leader regimes, over values of ethnic fractionalization.

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MINORITIES AND MISTRUST: ON THE ADOPTION OF ETHNIC RECOGNITION TO MANAGE CONFLICT

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1. A Model of Minorities and Recognition

We formalize the situation in terms of a modified ultimatum game where the regime leader chooses a policy regime and members of the opposition ethnic group choose whether to accept it or defect from it. So as not to distract from our main theoretical interests, we avoid considerations of commitment or renegotiation of offers, limiting the analysis to a one-shot game. Even this highly stylized and simplified model provides useful insights on the potential strategic logic behind the adoption or avoidance of recognition.

We suppose that the regime leader is from an ethnic group of size n_i and the opposition group is of size n_o. Specifically, suppose the leader starts by choosing a policy regime, (P, X), which consists of a choice of recognition or non-recognition, $P \in \{R, N\}$, and an amount to distribute to members of the opposition group $X = (X_1, ..., X_{n_o})'$, with $X \in \mathbb{R}_+^{n_o}$. Next, opposition members receive a noisy signal about the leader's allocation, $Y = X + \epsilon$, and then choose whether to accept the regime or defect, $a_{ok} = \{A, D\}$ for member k. Both the leader and opposition group members seek to maximize their expected utility.

If opposition member k accepts, its expected utility is based on its beliefs over the value of the regime $\hat{\mu}_k$ for members of its group and then an idiosyncratic component, $\omega_k \in \mathbb{R}$, unique and observed by opposition members but not the leader—that is, $\hat{\mu}_k + \omega_k$. The idiosyncratic term captures that there may be asymmetries in the information available among co-ethnics versus between ethnic group members. It also allows us to focus consideration only on the marginal agent that resides at the quantile of the distribution of ω_ks that defines the minimum number needed for a critical mass to organize for contention. From here on we focus attention on the actions of this marginal opposition member, a_{om}, where m indexes this marginal member. We suppose that the regime leader has a uniform prior on the distribution of the ω_k's. If we do not have a critical mass of opposition members who defect–that is, if the marginal opposition member accepts—then the leader receives a payoff of

$$EU_i(P, X|a_{om} = A) = B - n_o\bar{X},$$

where B is the full value of resources available in society and $n_o\bar{X}$ is the total value of resources allocated to the opposition group. We assume that the leader does what it pleases with these resources—that is, for the sake of the present analysis, we bracket considerations of managing intra-ethnic group relations for the leader.

If the marginal agent defects, we assume that contention occurs over the benefit, B, with a result that is favorable to the leader with probability $\pi(\eta, P)$ and favorable to the opposition with probability $1 - \pi(\eta, P)$, with $\eta = \frac{n_i}{n_o}$. The arguments in $\pi(.)$ indicate that the probability of successful contention is a function of relative group sizes as well as the choice about recognition. Let $\partial\pi/\partial\frac{n_i}{n_o} > 0$, that is, that the probability of successful contention is a function of size, as one would assume naturally. This assumption will not be so meaningful in our analysis because we condition on ex ante beliefs such that

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opposition groups, whether large or small, that give them reason to contest. Also, suppose

$$\pi(\eta, R) - \pi(\eta, N) < 0 \text{ if } \eta < 1, \text{ while}$$
$$\pi(\eta, R) - \pi(\eta, N) > 0 \text{ if } \eta \geq 1.$$

This is a blunt assumption of structural advantages for larger ethnic groups. The motivation for this assumption is that recognition, in allowing for the free flow of information about ethnic groups, facilitates ethnic group mobilization, and we take this to be more advantageous for larger groups (e.g., this would be the case for any process in which the effects of recognition are proportional to group size). While this assumption has immediate implications for how majority versus minority groups view the value of recognition, this assumption does not do all of the work in the analysis below. In fact, as we show below, it simply establishes a threshold against which one weighs other effects of the informational role of recognition.

Defection by the marginal opposition member yields expected utility of

$$EU_m(D|P, X) = EU_m(D|P) = (1 - \pi(\eta, P))v(B, n_o) - c_{om},$$

where $v(B, n_o)$ is the value conferred to the marginal opposition group member under its group controlling the resource, B, while c_{om} is the cost of that the marginal member faces under contention. Let $\partial v/\partial B > 0$ and $\partial v/\partial n_o \leq 0$. The leader has an expected utility of

$$EU_i(P, X|a_{om} = D) = \pi(\eta, P)B - c_i(X),$$

where $c_i(X)$ are the leader's costs given contention with $c_i' > 0$. It is assumed that the such costs are less than what the leader would have to pay were the opposition to accept ($c_i(X) < n_o\bar{X}$).

We have already assumed that under contention, recognition confers differential advantages depending on group size. That will structure the leader's incentives for recognition should contention be the anticipated result of the game. Under acceptance by the marginal opposition group member, we operationalize the institution of recognition in terms of the precision of the information that is available to an opposition group member in updating its beliefs about the allocation it receives, $\hat{X}_k$. Because the leader has no differentiating information for opposition group members, opposition group members must infer that the signals are of the form $Y_k = \bar{X} + \epsilon_k$ for $k = 1, ..., n$ for $\bar{X} = n_0^{-1}X$. Thus, the expected utility to the marginal member of accepting the leader's regime proposal is

$$EU_m(A|P, X) = \hat{\bar{X}},$$

where $\hat{\bar{X}}$ is the mean of the marginal member's posterior about $\bar{X}$ given its observed signal in X, that is $Y_m = X_m + \epsilon_m$, and its prior belief, χ_m. We assume that the marginal member updates beliefs about the distribution of $\bar{X}$ rationally through Bayes' rule.

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As discussed above, opposition members' priors are characterized by *ex ante* "mistrust," by which we mean that that opposition members' prior beliefs about the average amount that leader will allocate, call these priors $\chi_1, ..., \chi_{n_o}$, are below what would be necessary for stave off contention by a critical mass of opposition members. For the marginal opposition member is X_R^*, we write this as $\chi_m < \min_P EU_m(D|P)$. We suppose that the leader has unbiased beliefs about opposition members' priors. Let $\sigma_P^2 = Var[\epsilon_k|P]$, and suppose that $\sigma_R^2 < \sigma_N^2$, which formalizes the idea that recognition allows for more precise observation about ethnic group members' wellbeing.

We use backward induction to solve for a pure strategy equilibrium,

$$S = (S_i^*, a_{om}^*) = ((P^*, X^*), a_{om}^*)$$

in which the leader makes a uniform offer, X^*, to all opposition members.

We begin with the following lemma:

Lemma 1. *Fix the offer made by the leader as $\bar{X} > \chi_m$, where the latter is the prior belief of the marginal opposition member. Then the marginal opposition's posterior belief, $\hat{\bar{X}}$, is higher under recognition ($P = R$) than under non-recognition ($P = N$).*

Proof. By standard results on Bayesian updating,

$$\hat{\bar{X}} = \alpha(\sigma_P^2)\bar{X} + (1 - \alpha(\sigma_P^2))\chi_m,$$

where $\alpha' < 0$. Thus, fixing $\bar{X} > \chi_m$, the marginal member's posterior mean will be higher under the lower variance information condition that recognition provides. □

As an illustration, suppose both priors and the ϵ_k's are normally distributed. Then,

$$\alpha(\sigma_P^2) = \frac{s_k^2}{\sigma_P^2(s_k^2 + \sigma_P^2)},$$

where s^2 is the variance of the opposition member's prior on $\bar{X}$.

We can now characterize equilibria.

Proposition 1. *Under the assumptions listed above, we have the following strategy profiles, S, as symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria:*

1. *Given $\eta \geq 1$, $S = ((R, \bar{X}^*), A)$ if $B - n_o\bar{X}^* > \pi(\eta, R)B - c_i(0)$ and $S = ((R, 0), D)$ otherwise, and*

2. *Given $\eta < 1$,*

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(a) $S = ((R, \bar{X}^*), A)$ *if*

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^* > B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger \text{ and } B - n_o\bar{X}^* > \pi(\eta, N)B - c_i(0),$$

(b) $S = ((N, \bar{X}^\dagger), A)$ *if*

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger > B - n_o\bar{X}^* \text{ and } B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger > \pi(\eta, N)B - c_i(0), and$$

(c) $S = ((N, 0), D)$ *otherwise.*

where

$$\bar{X}^* = \frac{(1 - \pi(\eta, R))v(B, n_o) - c_{om} - (1 - \alpha(\sigma_R^2))}{\alpha(\sigma_R^2)}.$$

and

$$\bar{X}^\dagger = \frac{(1 - \pi(\eta, N))v(B, n_o) - c_{om} - (1 - \alpha(\sigma_N^2))}{\alpha(\sigma_N^2)}.$$

Proof. (Case 1: $\eta \geq 1$.*)* By Lemma 1, to induce acceptance the leader needs to satisfy

$$\bar{X} \geq \frac{EU_m(D|R) - (1 - \alpha(\sigma_R^2))}{\alpha(\sigma_R^2)}$$

The leader will set it equal to minimally satisfy the condition. So,

$$\bar{X}^* = \frac{(1 - \pi(\eta, R))v(B, n_o) - c_{om} - (1 - \alpha(\sigma_R^2))}{\alpha(\sigma_R^2)},$$

This results in payoff of,

$$EU_i(R, (\bar{X}^*, ..., \bar{X}^*)|a_{om} = A) = B - n_o\bar{X}^*.$$

The leader will make such an offer if payoff exceeds the maximal contention value,

$$EU_i(R, 0|a_{om} = D) = \pi(\eta, R)B - c_i(0).$$

So, $S = ((R, (\bar{X}^*, ..., \bar{X}^*)), A)$ if

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^* > \pi(\eta, R)B - c_i(0)$$

and $S = ((R, 0), D)$ otherwise.

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(Case 2: $\eta < 1$.) First, if the leader were to choose recognition, the resulting payoffs would be of the same form as we have derived for the $\eta \geq 1$ case, and so we would have again the leader preferring $S = ((R, (\bar{X}^*, ..., \bar{X}^*)), A)$ if

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^* > \pi(\eta, R)B - c_i(0)$$

and $S = ((R, 0), D)$ otherwise.

Under non-recognition, to induce acceptance, the leader needs to satisfy,

$$\bar{X} \geq \frac{EU_m(D|N) - (1 - \alpha(\sigma_N^2))}{\alpha(\sigma_N^2)},$$

in which case it would select

$$\bar{X}^\dagger = \frac{(1 - \pi(\eta, N))v(B, n_o) - c_{om} - (1 - \alpha(\sigma_N^2))}{\alpha(\sigma_N^2)}.$$

Then, the leader prefers $S = ((N, (\bar{X}^\dagger, ..., \bar{X}^\dagger)), A)$ if

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger > \pi(\eta, N)B - c_i(0),$$

and $S = ((N, 0), D)$ otherwise.

We know that

$$\pi(\eta, N)B - c_i(0) > \pi(\eta, R)B - c_i(0),$$

and so the leader would never choose $S_i = (R, 0)$. The relationship between $\bar{X}^*$ and $\bar{X}^\dagger$ is ambiguous as it depends on the magnitude of the effect of the choice of $P = R, N$ on $\pi(.)$ relative to $\alpha(.)$. The leader's preferences over $S_i = (R, \bar{X}^*)$ versus $S_i = (N, \bar{X}^\dagger)$ depend on these values. Thus we have that $S = ((R, \bar{X}^*), A)$ is an equilibrium if

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^* > B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger \text{ and } B - n_o\bar{X}^* > \pi(\eta, N)B - c_i(0),$$

$S = ((N, \bar{X}^\dagger), A)$ is an equilibrium if

$$B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger > B - n_o\bar{X}^* \text{ and } B - n_o\bar{X}^\dagger > \pi(\eta, N)B - c_i(0),$$

and $S = ((N, 0), D)$ otherwise. □

For majority group leaders ($\eta \geq 1$), recognition is a dominant strategy because it increases both its strength in contention and its effectiveness in persuading mistrustful opposition members of good intentions. For minority group leaders ($\eta < 1$), the situation is more complicated. The effects on the persuasiveness of offers to opposition members is the same as for majority group leaders, but this is counterbalanced by effects of reducing its strength in contention against a majority opposition group. As such minority group leaders may find reason to choose non-recognition possibly contributing to an equilibrium that results in contention and possibly contributing to one that results in a regime that the opposition accepts.

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2. Case Table

Table A1. Cases of constitutions, constitutional amendments, and comprehensive political settlements adopted in conflict-affected countries, 1990-2012

Country	Year of Settlement	Document	Context	Leader type	Outcome	Baseline probability of recogntion
Zimbabwe	2008	Zimbabwe Power Sharing Agreement	Post-election violence in 2008	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.00
Cambodia	1991	Paris Agreement	Civil war starting in 1975	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.02
Cote d'Ivoire	2007	Ougadougou Agreement	Civil war starting in 2002	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.05
Chad	1996	Constitution	Insurgency since 1989 leading to Deby regime.	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.06
Congo	2001	Constitution (of 2002, but promulgated at end of 2001)	Civil war and instability since 1997.	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.07
Kenya	2010	Constitution	Electoral violence in 2007-8	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.07
Mozambique	1990	Constitution	RENAMO rebellion starting in 1976	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.08
Cambodia	1993	Constitution	Civil war starting in 1975	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.09
Nigeria	1999	Constitution	Inter-ethnic and resource-based conflict in Delta and Northern States since 1998	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.09
Central African Republic	2004	Constitution	Armed conflict since 2001	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.10
Chad	2005	Constitution (amendment)	Civil wars starting in 1966	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.11
Madagascar	2010	Constitution	2009 violent political crisis	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.11
Guinea	2010	Constitution	Conflict and instability since 2000	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.12
Niger	1995	Peace Agreement with ORA	Northern Tuareg and Eastern Toubou uprisings starting in 1994	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.13
Cote d'Ivoire	2003	Linas Marcoussiss Agreement	Civil war starting in 2002	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.15
Algeria	2008	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing civil war since 1991	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.16
Eritrea	1997	Constitution	Internal conflict starting in 1997 (EIJM)	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.17
Guinea-Bissau	1998	Abuja Peace Agreement	Armed uprising starting in 1998	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.18
Thailand	2007	Constitution	2005-6 political crisis and Patani insurgency since 2003	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.19
Angola	1992	Constitution (amendment)	Civil war starting in 1975	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.19
Burundi	1992	Constitution	1988 and 1991 uprisings	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.20
Pakistan (1971-)	1991	Constitution (amendment)	MQM violent conflict since 1990	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.21
Algeria	1996	Constitution (amendment)	Civil war starting in 1991	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.28
Bangladesh	1997	Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord	Shanti Bahini insurgency since 1977	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.30
Liberia	2003	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Civil war starting in 1989	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.32
Uganda	2005	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing regional rebellions since 1986 (north) and 1995 (west)	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.32
Congo, Democratic Republic	2005	Constitution	Civil war starting in 1996	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.32
Pakistan (1971-)	2010	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing violence between government and various tribal/provincial and extremist groups starting in 1990	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.32
Rwanda	1993	Arusha Accord	RPF insurgency starting in 1990	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.35
South Africa	1993	Interim Constitution	ANC anti-apartheid militancy since the 1961, Inkatha conflict	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.35
Pakistan (1971-)	1999	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing violence between government and various tribal/provincial and extremist groups starting in 1990	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.35
Angola	1994	Lusaka Protocol	Ongoing civil war since 1975	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.36
Angola	2002	Memorandum of Understanding	Ongoing civil war since 1975	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.39
Turkey	2010	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing PKK insurgency since 1984	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.39
Uganda	1995	Constitution	Regional rebellions since 1986 (north) and 1995 (west)	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.42
Mozambique	1992	Constitution	Ongoing RENAMO rebellion since 1976	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.45
Guinea	2001	Constitution (amendment)	Rebellion since 2000	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.46

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Table A1 (continued)

Country	Year of Settlement	Document	Context	Leader type	Outcome	Baseline probability of recogntion
Uganda	2002	Yumbe Agreement	Regional rebellion in west since 1995	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.46
Somalia	2004	Somali Transitional Charter	Civil war since overthrow of Barre regime in 1991	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.49
Iraq	2005	Constitution	US invasion and ensuing conflict starting in 2003	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.51
Rwanda	2003	Constitution	Civil war since 1990	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.52
Ethiopia (1993-)	1994	Constitution	Secessionist war with Eritrea since 1961 and complex internal wars since 1976	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.56
Burundi	2005	Constitution	Civil war starting in 1993	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.57
Pakistan (1971-)	2003	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing violence between government and various tribal/provincial and extremist groups starting in 1990	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.58
El Salvador	1992	Chapultepec Accords	Civil war since 1979	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.60
Sierra Leone	2002	Constitution (amendment)	Civil war and instability since 1991	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.60
Yemen	1994	Constitution (amendment)	Southern secessionist uprising since 1994	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.66
Afghanistan	2004	Constitution	Civil war starting in 1979	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.66
Turkey	2007	Constitution (amendment)	PKK insurgency since 1984	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.67
Myanmar	2008	Constitution	Tribal uprisings since independence in 1948	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.67
Indonesia	2002	Constitution	Protests in 1998 followed by ethnic violence (Maluku, Kalimantan) and renewed separatist violence (Irian Jaya/Papua, Timor Leste, Aceh) starting in 1999	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.71
India	1993	Bodoland Autonomous Council Act	Insurgency beginning in 1989	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.73
Haiti	1993	Governors island agreement	Coup attempts and related violence starting in 1989	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.75
Pakistan (1971-)	1997	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing violence between government and various tribal/provincial and extremist groups starting in 1990	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.80
Sudan (-2011)	2005	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Second Sudanese Civil War since 1983	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.85
Burundi	2000	Arusha Accord	Civil war since 1993	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.86
Sudan (-2011)	1998	Constitution	Second Sudanese Civil War since 1983	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	0.89
Nicaragua	1990	Constitution (amendment)	Conflict rooted in Sandanista revolution starting in 1977	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.90
Ethiopia (-1992)	1991	Transitional Period Charter	Overthrow of Derg	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.90
Nepal	2007	Interim Constitution	Maoist insurgency starting in 1996	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.90
Laos	1991	Constitution	Armed conflict between government and Hmong resistance	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	0.93
Tajikistan	1999	Constitution (amendment)	Armed conflict between government and United Tajik Opposition groups since 1992	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.93
Guatemala	1996	Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace	Civil war between government and leftist guerrillas dating back to 1960	Plurality leader	Expected rec	0.96
Colombia	1991	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing violent conflicts dating back to 1964	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	0.98
Peru	1993	Constitution	Shining Path rebellion starting in 1981	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	1.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995	Dayton Agreement	Civil war since 1992 secession	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Georgia	2006	Constitution	Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts since 1992	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Moldova	1994	Constitution	Dniestr conflict since 1992	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Russia	1992	Constitution (amendment) and constitutions of republics promulgated	Conflicts contributing to Soviet Union dissolution	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Russia	1993	Constitution	Political crisis and conflicts contributing to Soviet Union dissolution	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Russia	2000	Revisions to constitutions of republics	Caucasus conflicts (Chechnya, Dagestan)	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Russia	2003	Chechen and Daghestan constitutions	Chechen conflict	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Macedonia	2001	Ohrid Agreement	UCK (ethnic Albanian) uprising in 2001	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
United Kingdom	1998	The Good Friday Agreement	Civil conflict (the Troubles) since 1966	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)

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Table A1 (continued)

Country	Year of Settlement	Document	Context	Leader type	Outcome	Baseline probability of recogntion
Yugoslavia	1992	Constitution	Separatist struggles in former Yugoslav republics outside Serbia and Montenegro	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Serbia and Montenegro	1999	Rambouillet Agreement	Kosovo secessionist armed struggle since 1996	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (Europe)
Indonesia	2005	MOU between GOI and GAM (Aceh)	Insurgency beginning in 1976	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (FH `free')
Mali	1992	Pacte National and Constitution	Azawad and Touareg struggles, Toure coup	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (FH `free')
Papua New Guinea	2001	Bougainville peace agreement	Uprising starting in 1989	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	1.00 (FH `free')
Philippines	1996	Mindanao Final Agreement	Moro insurgencies since 1975	Plurality leader	Expected rec	1.00 (FH `free')
South Africa	1996	Constitution	Episodic violence between IKP, ANC and other political and communal groups	Minority leader	Unexpected rec	1.00 (FH `free')
Djibouti	1994	Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation	Civil war (Afar rebellion) starting in 1992	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	NA (No excl. prop.)
Djibouti	2001	Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord	FRUD uprising since 1991	Plurality leader	Unexpected non-rec	NA (No excl. prop.)
Pakistan (1971-)	2011	Constitution (amendment)	Ongoing violence between government and various tribal/provincial and extremist groups starting in 1990	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	NA (No excl. prop.)
Sierra Leone	1999	Lome Agreement	Civil war since 1991	Minority leader	Expected non-rec	NA (No excl. prop.)
South Sudan	2011	Transitional Constitution of South Sudan	Civil war and separatist struggle since 1983	Plurality leader	Expected rec	NA (No excl. prop.)

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Sources: Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2010); UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset and UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/). Cases are ordered by the baseline probability of recognition, which we compute using results from model (8) in Table 3 above.

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3. Control Variables and Sources

Table A2. Control variables, coding rules, and associated data sources

No.	Variable	Condition	Variable name	Explanation	Temporal variation	Source	Coding details
1	Minority leader	Minority (i.e., non-plurality) ethnic group leader in given year	minldrnow	Focuses on ethnicity of the head of government	Yearly	Fearon et al. (2007), CIA World Factbook, , various news outlets	Fearon et al minldr1=1 in given year or coding resembling that based on other information
2	Pre-violence minority leader	Minority (i.e., non-plurality) ethnic group leader at conflict onset	minldrons	Focuses on ethnicity of the head of government	Constant	Fearon et al. (2007), CIA World Factbook, , various news outlets	Fearon et al minldr1=1 in year of onset or coding resembling that based on other information
3	Ethnic fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization	ethfracnow	Ethnic fractionalization index	Constant	Esteban et al. (2012)	
4	Ethnic conflict	Ethnic conflict	ethconf	War with recruitment along ethnic lines or demands for ethnic recognition, autonomy, or secession.	Constant	EPR	ETHNOWAR=1 since onset, from EPR wars dataset
5	Excluded proportion	Share of population excluded from power in given year	exclnow	EPR coding of share of population excluded from power	Yearly	EPR	EPR rexclpop in given year
6	Regionally concentrated groups	Ethnic groups geographically concentrated	regconcgr	Whether there are any regionally concentrated groups (1) or not (0).	Constant	Geo EPR, CIA World Factbook, other information on ethnic groups accessed through the web.	Geo EPR: assigned a zero if no groups with type = 1 or 4, or indications as such based on information from CIA World Factbook or other information on ethnic groups in country
7	log(GDP/capita)	Income level in given year	rgdppcnow	Real GDP per capita in given year	Yearly	World Bank Development Indicators	Real GDP per capita
8	Freedom house "free", "partly free"	Democratic institutions	fh_free, fh_partfree	Degree of democratic consolidation at onset	Constant	Quality of Governance Dataset	Freedom House score
9	log(mountain percent)	Mountainous terrain	logmntnpct	Natural log of percentage of territory that is mountainous	Constant	Fearon and Laitin (2003)	
10	log(fatalities + 1)	Level of recent violence	lgfat	Natural log of total numbers of fatalities as recorded across the three UCDP violence datasets	Yearly	UCDP conflict database	
11	PITF atrocities index, historical maximum	Atrocity during war	pitfatrocmaghistmax	Maxmium value of PITF atrocities index of violence in years prior to the given year	Yearly	PITF	PITF genocide/politicide death magitude
12	Military Victory	Leader presided over military victory	postmilvic	Regime in power resolved most recent episode of conflict through military victory	Yearly	UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset	Outcome = 3 or 4 for most recent episode of conflict up to given year
13	Previous powersharing	Previously existing ethnic power-sharing arrangements	prevpwrshr	State level power sharing in years prior to the current year. (Note that this seems to measure de facto powersharing, rather than the the existence of any agreements calling for it --- e.g., Angola Lusaka agreement of 1994 or Rwanda Arusha accord of 1993, which werenever implemented.)	Yearly (running tally)	EPR	EPR pwrshare=1 in any year prior to given year
14	International engagement	Major international engagement	intleng	Major power multilateral engagement up to the given year.	Yearly (running tally)	MILC, UNSC resolutions archive	MILC P5=1 or UN=1 or a UNSC resolution passed on the country's conflict at some point since onset up to given year

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4. Control Variables Summary Statistics

Table A3. Summary statistics for control variables, by leader type

	Non-minority leader			**Minority leader**		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Pre-violence minority leader (0/1)	0.11	0.32	45	0.85	0.36	41
Ethnic fractionalization	0.47	0.20	45	0.62	0.22	41
Ethnic conflict (0/1)	0.71	0.46	45	0.73	0.45	41
Excluded proportion	0.18	0.19	42	0.30	0.27	39
Regionally concentrated groups (0/1)	0.96	0.21	45	0.90	0.30	41
log(GDP/capita)	6.87	1.22	45	6.25	0.97	41
Freedom House "free" (0/1)	0.09	0.29	45	0.05	0.22	41
Freedom House "partly free" (0/1)	0.53	0.50	45	0.49	0.51	41
log(mountain percent)	2.56	1.24	45	2.46	1.34	41
log(fatalities in most recent conflict)	4.66	3.10	45	4.88	2.80	41
PITF atrocities index, historical maximum (0-5)	1.82	2.16	45	1.66	2.02	41
Military victory	0.16	0.37	45	0.07	0.26	41
Years since 1990	10.09	6.19	45	8.68	6.07	41
Previous powersharing arrangements (0/1)	0.64	0.48	45	0.73	0.45	41
International engagement (0/1)	0.40	0.50	45	0.39	0.49	41

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5. Non-parametric Matching Estimation

We use a non-parametric matching estimator to evaluate the robustness of our regression findings to dropping the linear functional form restriction. Specificallty, we use a bias-adjusted nearest-neighbor estimator with bias adjustment (Abadie and Imbens 2011). In Table A4 below, we first show balance on our control variables after matching. Comparing these results to the summary statistics shown in Table A3, we see that the matching procedure yields improvements in balancing the means and standard deviations of the control variables (although in analyzing Table A3 we see that covariate balance was not so bad in the original sample). Of course some imbalances remain, which is why it is important to use the post-matching bias adjustment. Table A5 shows our matching estimate, which resembles the regression estimates from Table 3.

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Table A4. Control variables balance after matching

	Non-minority leader			**Minority leader**		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Pre-violence minority leader (0/1)	0.41	0.50	39	0.76	0.43	42
Ethnic fractionalization	0.51	0.15	39	0.65	0.16	42
Ethnic conflict (0/1)	0.85	0.37	39	0.79	0.42	42
Excluded proportion	0.19	0.25	39	0.23	0.21	42
Regionally concentrated groups (0/1)	0.95	0.22	39	0.98	0.15	42
log(GDP/capita)	6.51	1.14	39	6.39	0.77	42
Freedom House "free" (0/1)	0.05	0.22	39	0.10	0.30	42
Freedom House "partly free" (0/1)	0.69	0.47	39	0.40	0.50	42
log(mountain percent)	2.63	1.05	39	2.49	1.19	42
log(fatalities in most recent conflict)	4.51	2.01	39	4.67	1.83	42
PITF atrocities index, historical maximum (0-5)	2.19	2.30	39	1.40	1.95	42
Military victory	0.08	0.27	39	0.12	0.33	42
Years since 1990	9.79	5.36	39	9.90	5.28	42
Previous powersharing arrangements (0/1)	0.85	0.37	39	0.74	0.45	42
International engagement (0/1)	0.26	0.44	39	0.29	0.46	42

Sample omits 6 observations because of missing data on the “excluded proportion” variable. See the notes for Table 3 in the main text for details.

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Table A5. Matching estimate

	ATE	S.E.
Minority leader	-0.21*	(0.12)
Observations	81	

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

ATE= Average treatment effect estimate based on a bias-adjusted, matched difference-in-means.

S.E. = Matching standard error estimate based on Abadie and Imbens (2011).

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6. Event History Analyses of Agreements Reached

Table A6. Event history analysis of minority ethnic group leader as a correlate of the reaching of political agreement or constitutional change (logistic regression with spell duration trends, marginal effects reported)

Unit of analysis is the country-year in the risk set, defined as a case of ongoing violence or violence in the preceding year with no agreement or constitutional change.
Outcome is an agreement or constitutional change in the given year (0/1).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority leader (d)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pre-violence minority leader (d)		-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ethnic conflict (d)			0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Excluded proportion			-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Regionally concentrated groups (d)			-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.01
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
log(GDP/capita)				-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Freedom House 'free' (d)				-0.02	-0.00	0.00
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Freedom House 'partly free' (d)				0.02	0.04	0.03
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(mountain percent)				-0.00	-0.00	0.00
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PITF atrocities historical max				0.00	0.00	0.00
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Previous powersharing (d)					0.02	0.01
					(0.02)	(0.02)
International engagement (d)					0.04*	0.04
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	1037	1037	924	924	924	924
Spell duration trend (up to third order)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering by country.
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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Table A7. Event history analysis of minority etnic group leader as a correlate of the reaching of political agreement or constitutional change (discrete time Cox/conditional logistic regression; model coefficients reported)

Unit of analysis is the country-year in the risk set, defined as a case of ongoing violence or violence in the preceding year with no agreement or constitutional change.
Outcome is an agreement or constitutional change in the given year (0/1).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minority leader	0.34	0.37	0.40	0.42	0.46	0.46
	(0.21)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Pre-violence minority leader		-0.03	0.24	0.09	0.02	0.02
		(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.90	-0.82	-0.98	-0.98
			(0.75)	(0.82)	(0.96)	(0.96)
Ethnic conflict			0.11	0.06	-0.02	-0.02
			(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Excluded proportion			-0.30	-0.27	-0.20	-0.20
			(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Regionally concentrated groups			-0.15	-0.04	0.23	0.23
			(0.58)	(0.73)	(0.76)	(0.76)
log(GDP/capita)				-0.11	-0.10	-0.10
				(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Freedom House 'free'				-0.33	-0.15	-0.15
				(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.82)
Freedom House 'partly free'				0.33	0.47	0.47
				(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.36)
log(mountain percent)				-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
				(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
PITF atrocities historical max				0.06	0.05	0.05
				(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Previous powersharing					0.26	0.26
					(0.41)	(0.41)
International engagement					0.46	0.46
					(0.29)	(0.29)
Observations	980	980	874	874	874	874

Standard errors account for clustering by country.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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7. Estimates for constitutions versus settlements

Table A8. Replicating Table 3 Model (5), but checking for differences between settlements versus constitutions, logistic regression estimates (marginal effects reported)

Outcome is ethnic recognition in constitution or settlement (0/1)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority leader (d)	-0.46***	-0.48**	-0.52**
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.22)
Pre-violence minority leader (d)	0.05	0.04	0.20
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.27)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.61	-0.62	-0.28
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.56)
Ethnic conflict (d)	0.17	0.18	0.05
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Excluded proportion	0.42	0.42	-0.29
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.43)
Regionally concentrated groups (d)	0.37***	0.37***	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.37)
log(GDP/capita)	-0.01	-0.01	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Freedom House 'partly free' (d)	0.19	0.18	-0.10
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.22)
log(mountain percent)	0.26**	0.26**	0.19
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
log(fatalities + 1)	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
PITF atrocities historical max	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Military victory (d)	-0.34***	-0.35***	-0.34**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Previous powersharing (d)	-0.04	-0.04	-0.10
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.27)
International engagement (d)	0.28**	0.28**	0.22
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)
Settlement (d)	**-0.11**	**-0.15**	
	(0.15)	**(0.25)**	
Settlement X Minority leader (d)		**0.08**	
		(0.37)	
Region dummies	N	N	N
Year trend (linear + quadratic)	N	N	N
Observations	75	75	52
Omitted observations	No excl. prop. FH `free'	No excl. prop. FH `free'	No excl. prop. FH `free' Settlement cases

Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering by country. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

"No excl. prop." refers to cases omitted due to missing "Excluded proportion" data: Djibouti 1994 and 2001; Pakistan 2011; Sierra Leone 1999, and Sudan 2011.

FH `free' refers to cases coded as "free" by Freedom House. These predict recognition perfectly and so these cases are dropped from models (4)-(10). Model (3) includes only constitution cases, omitting all comprehensive settlements. Among the 30 settlement cases, minority leaders adopt recognition only 3 out of 13 times (23%), while non-minority leaders adopt recognition 10 out of 17 times (59%). The number of observations is too small to fit the regression for these cases.

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8. Interaction between minority rule and levels of bloodshed

Table A9. Replicating Table 3 Model (5), but checking for interaction effects with fatality rate and atrocities, logistic regression estimates (marginal effects reported)

Outcome is ethnic recognition in constitution or settlement (0/1)		
Model	(1)	(2)
Minority leader (d)	-0.70***,##	-0.28#
	(0.20)	(0.23)
Pre-violence minority leader (d)	0.01	0.01
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.75	-0.51
	(0.54)	(0.47)
Ethnic conflict (d)	0.17	0.19
	(0.20)	(0.17)
Excluded proportion	0.36	0.35
	(0.26)	(0.28)
Regionally concentrated groups (d)	0.37***	0.33**
	(0.13)	(0.15)
log(GDP/capita)	0.02	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Freedom House 'partly free' (d)	0.13	0.16
	(0.18)	(0.18)
log(mountain percent)	0.27**	0.26**
	(0.12)	(0.11)
log(fatalities + 1)	-0.02	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)
PITF atrocities historical max	-0.10	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Military victory (d)	-0.37***	-0.32***
	(0.14)	(0.12)
Previous powersharing (d)	0.03	-0.02
	(0.21)	(0.21)
International engagement (d)	0.25	0.23
	(0.17)	(0.15)
Min. incumb. X log(fatalities + 1)	0.08##	
	(0.06)	
Min. incumb. X PITF atrocities		-0.10#
		(0.07)
Region dummies	N	N
Year trend (linear + quadratic)	N	N
Observations	75	75
Omitted observations	No excl. prop. FH `free'	No excl. prop. FH `free'

Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering by country. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
jointly significant at p < .10, ## jointly significant at p<.05.
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
"No excl. prop." refers to cases omitted due to missing "Excluded proportion" data: Djibouti 1994 and 2001; Pakistan 2011; Sierra Leone 1999, and Sudan 2011.
FH `free' refers to cases coded as "free" by Freedom House. These predict recognition perfectly and so these cases are dropped from models (4)-(10).

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9. European Cases

The seven European countries in our dataset are all examples of countries with plurality ethnic group leaders choosing ethnic recognition. These cases include Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Georgia (2006), Russia (1992/3, 2000, 2003), Macedonia (2001), United Kingdom/Northern Ireland (1998), Yugoslavia (1992), and Serbia and Montenegro (1999). We focus here on the 1995 Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement for Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, because these are the most substantive of the documents among the European cases. In Bosnia, the relevant leader during the negotiation of the Dayton Accords was the plurality Bosniak president Alija Izetbegovic. The Dayton Accords include extensive recognition-based terms, including self-government provisions for the Republica Srpska (Annex 4, Article 3) and the sharing of parliamentary, executive and judicial positions between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs through ethnic quotas (Annex 4, Articles 4-6). For the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, we focus on decision-making by United Kingdom prime minister Tony Blair representing British interests vis-à-vis Irish nationalist Republicans in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement marked the first time that the British government formally recognized the Irish-British identity cleavage (Agreement Article 1.vi) and a right to self-determination for Northern Ireland (Agreement Article 1.iv). The Agreement requires that members of the Northern Ireland assembly “register a designation of identity” as part of a mechanism that ensures “cross-community” consent on major decisions (Annex B, Strand 1, Section 6).

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Evidence of Structural Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The ethnic structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina includes, according to the 1991 census, approximately 44 percent who identify as Bosniak Muslims, 32 percent as Serbs, and 17 percent as Croats (Trbovich 2008). In the political science literature, the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia is a canonical case of ethnic mobilization and the intensification of inter-ethnic mistrust through ethnic "security dilemmas," ethnic cleansing and atrocities, and elite manipulation (Burg and Shoup 1999, 169-185; Posen 1993; Woodward 1995, chaps. 9-10). Irredentist Serb and Croat factions, and their allies in neighboring Serbia and Croatia, stoked the potential for remobilization against Izetbegovic and others who sought to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina united (Burg and Shoup 1999, 391-392). At the Dayton negotiations, Izetbegovic represented those interested in preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the "dueling irredentisms" associated with Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian leader Franco Tudjman (Saideman and Ayres 2008, chap. 2; Holbrooke 1998, chaps. 16-18).

Evidence of Dilemma of Recognition Decision-Making Process in Bosnia-Herzegovina

While institutionalization of ethnicity has roots partly in the legacy of minority protection and ethnic representation in pre-war Yugoslavia (Bieber 2004; Pupavac 2005), Izetbegovic seems to have appreciated the functional value of recognizing Croats and Serbs. Institutionalizing ethnicity allowed Izetbegovic to help mitigate what Jovic (2001) discusses as the anxiety of ethnic survival among the Croatian and Serbian minority communities amidst "fears of becoming a minority" and being "existentially endangered." Such anxieties were pronounced among Bosnian Serbs whose increasing nationalism was fueled, according to (Trbovich 2008, 227), by the fear of "a loss of national identity." On the mobilization side of the equation, as a plurality leader, Izetbegovich also stood to gain politically from institutions

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facilitating mobilization on ethnic grounds. Nonetheless, as in the Burundi case, the even division that the Dayton Accords institutionalized between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs speaks as much to the goal of managing minority groups' mistrust as consolidating Bosniak gains.

Evidence of Structural Conditions in Northern Ireland

The primary cleavage that defines the Northern Ireland conflict (or the "Troubles") combines sectarian with national identities, with primarily Protestant Unionist factions seeking to maintain union with Britain and the primarily Catholic Republican factions calling for unification with Ireland (McGarry and O'Leary 1995; Ruane and Todd 1996). The most recent census at the time of the Agreement, in 1991, indicated a Catholic minority of about 42 percent in Northern Ireland and about 1.4 percent of the overall population of Great Britain (Jardine 1994). A discourse of differential fertility rates and outmigration contributed to a belief that Catholic and Protestant population shares in Northern Ireland were more equal by 1998 (Anderson et al. 2005). Our theory predicts that Tony Blair, as prime minister of the United Kingdom (also with a Protestant majority) would be open to a recognition-based strategy as a means primarily to manage the mistrust of those identifying as Irish in Northern Ireland, and such was the result.

Blair recounts in his memoir that he "had a constant problem of trust" with both the Nationalist and Unionist groups of Northern Ireland (Blair 2010, 163). The climate of mistrust between the unionist and Irish nationalist factions, and also between the Irish nationalist factions and the British government, is well documented in the literature and was perpetuated in large part by the threat of militant remobilization on both sides (Blair 2010, 180-182; MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007). Thus the relevant structural conditions appear to have been in place.

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Evidence of Dilemma of Recognition Decision-Making Process in Northern Ireland

The Good Friday agreement includes symbolic recognition of Irish and British identities as well as provisions guaranteeing "key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis" (Annex B, Strand 1, Section 5.d). Blair recognized the need to manage the expectations of the Irish minority in Northern Ireland and acknowledged the possibility that the agreement could contribute to mobilization towards Irish unity. But Blair figured his government could mitigate such impulses through the Agreement. As Blair put it, "on what basis and on what principles would Republicans accept [continued unification with Britain]? The answer, which then underpinned the formation of the Good Friday Agreement, was peace in return for power-sharing and equality" (2010, 174). Thus, the Agreement (i) offered representation guarantees for the Irish community within a Northern Ireland that was part of the Britain and (ii) also held out the promise for reconsideration of unification with Ireland should a majority in Northern Ireland come to demand it.

Additional Considerations for Europe

Given the consistent recognition outcome, we examined the role of regional *normative* influences in the European cases (Kymlicka 2008; Pupavac 2005). National policies on minorities have been fundamentally changed by countries' aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU) coupled with the EU's precondition of a model of minority rights (Johns 2003; Sasse 2005). External influences are pronounced in some of our European cases, as in the interventions in the states of the former Yugoslavia. In these cases, managing inter-ethnic tensions were a paramount concern (Grewe and Riegner 2011; Szasz 1996). Promotion of

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minority rights was an institutionalized tenet of European multilateral initiatives.[20] This distinguishes European regional initiatives from, say, those of the African Union, which has been more resistant to minority rights and minority-specific programming.

Without cases that provide variation in the minority status of leaders, we cannot say definitively whether the patterns in Europe are driven more by our proposed logic of recognition or by the regional norms and external intervention under such norms. The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, however. European organizations' various doctrines on protecting minority rights were very much the product of their experience in dealing with conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Presumably in the early cases the key forces were political dynamics such as those that our theory highlights. However, upon realizing the functional value of recognition, European organizations institutionalized capacities (such as assistance programs for minorities) and preconditions for European Union accession that could have increased the appeal of recognition, possibly even producing some cases of recognition that would not have existed in the absence of such supportive European institutions.

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[20] This is evident in the 1996 Vienna Concluding Document of the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security, Cooperation and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) 1990 Copenhagen Concluding Document, and the Council of Europe's 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Chandler 1999; Gál 2000).

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